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Abstract
Following popular protests at home and the fall of the government, Ukraine reversed course and
joined Georgia and Moldova in signing Association Agreements in June 2014. This article has
two main aims. First, using a gravity model of trade, it estimates the effects of deep and shallow
free trade agreements for the EaP (Eastern Partnership) states with Russia and the EU respectively.
Second, by relating the outcomes of the ﬁrst estimation to the quality of institutions, proxied with
the level of democracy and the level of corruption in the selected countries, the paper estimates the
effect on exports of changes in the quality of institutions. The main results show that the EaP coun-
tries gain signiﬁcantly from free trade agreements with the EU but little if anything from free trade
agreements with Russia, and that improvements in the quality of institutions in EaP countries have
played an important role in fostering exports.
Keywords: Free trade agreements; Eastern Partnership; European Union; gravity model; panel data;
institutions.
Introduction
In July 2013 the European Union (EU) announced that it had completed negotiations,
started early in 2012, on Association Agreements, including deep and comprehensive free
trade agreements (DCFTA), with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. These agreements were
to be initialled at the EaP (Eastern Partnership) Summit in Vilnius on 28–29 November
2013. The successful negotiation of DCFTAs with these three States in the short period
of 18months surprised many observers.1 The DCFTA agreement with Ukraine, already
initialled, was to be signed at the same time, subject to prior fulﬁllment by Ukraine of
certain conditions concerning, inter alia, its application of ‘selective justice’.2© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA
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1 Negotiating the DCFTA had taken Ukraine ﬁve years and starting negotiations had taken Georgia almost four years. Ar-
menia was a latecomer and had worse initial conditions than Georgia. The decision to start negotiations in 2012 and their
rapid conclusion were surprising. Compared with these countries, Moldova had a head-start through its negotiation of a re-
gional free trade agreement with the Western Balkans (CEFTA 2006) in close co-operation with the EU.
2 This refers most notably to the trial and imprisonment of former prime minister Yulia Timoshenko after Viktor
Yanukovich assumed the presidency in January 2010.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso and Per Magnus Wijkman2What was to follow was even more surprising. In September 2013, Armenia announced
that it would not initial its Association Agreement in Vilnius but would instead join the
ECU (Eurasian Customs Union) proposed by Russia. Armenia’s decision could have been
inﬂuenced by Russia’s threat otherwise to withdraw its troops from Azerbaijan, which
protected the region of Nagorno Karabahk, largely populated by Armenians. A few days
before the summit, President Yanukovich of Ukraine announced that he would postpone
signing the Association Agreement with the EU after Russia had offered signiﬁcant loans.
President Yanukovich’s decision had fateful consequences. Prolonged demonstrations
in Maidan Square in Kiev ended in violence and President Yanukovich ﬂed the country
on 21 February 2014. The next day Parliament elected a provisional president and
installed a new government. Within a week, armed ‘self-defence groups’ appeared in
Crimea and on 21 March, President Putin signed documents admitting Crimea and
Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. Since then, war has raged in the Donetsk and
Luhansk region.
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed the Association Agreements and DCFTAs with
the EU on 27 June 2014. The agreements require ratiﬁcation by each EU Member State
and the European Parliament.
This article assesses the beneﬁts of various integration regimes on exports. More specif-
ically, it evaluates and compares the effects of FTAs (free trade agreements) signed by EaP
countries with the EU and with Russia, and the role played by the quality of institutions (de-
mocracy and corruption) in fostering trade.We focus on the effects of both deep and shallow
FTAs on exports. While recognizing that FTAs may lead not only to trade creation but also
to trade diversion, we assume that the most likely result is an improvement in welfare.
The estimation strategy employed follows the most recent literature (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2007; Eicher et al., 2012; Head and Mayer, 2015) suggesting the use of
country-pair ﬁxed effects to control for the endogeneity of the FTA effects and the use
of exporter-and-time and importer-and-time dummy variables to control for the so-called
multilateral resistance factors.
The results suggest that the EaP countries, with Ukraine by far the largest in the group,
gain signiﬁcantly from FTAs with the EU, but gain little if anything from FTAs with Rus-
sia. The quality of institutions in EaP countries plays an important role in fostering trade.
The article is organized as follows. Section I presents the main theoretical framework,
describes the data and variables and speciﬁes the econometric models. Section II presents
the main results in terms of trade gains from recently signed DCFTAs and Section III re-
lates trade ﬂows with improvements in institutional quality. Section IV discusses the main
trade policy alternatives for EaP countries and proposes strengthening the EaP framework
and involving Russia. After this we conclude.
I. The Scope of Potential Trade
To quantify the trade effects of the different FTAs on bilateral exports we use the gravity
model of trade, a theoretical apparatus often used to estimate the effects of trade agree-
ments. Speciﬁcally, we assess how the trade ﬂows of the EaP States will be affected by:
• Entering into the EU, full membership (EU)
• A DCFTA with:
° EU (EUdeep)© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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• A shallow FTA with:
° EU (EUshallow)
° Russia3 (RUSshallow)
° Each of the EaP states (FTA-East)
We also say something about the intermediate case, which is likely to be the outcome
for the next few years if Georgia, Moldova and perhaps Ukraine as well turn west while
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus turn east.
We ﬁrst present the data we use, the empirical models and methods, the results of
alternative regional integration scenarios and further results relating trade to the quality
of institutions.
Data and Variables
We obtain bilateral exports for 60 exporters and 150 importers4 from the UN-
COMTRADE database for the period 1995 to 2012 and data on income variables from
the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2014). We computed distances between
capitals and other gravity dummies (common border, common language, colonial
relationship and having been part of the same country) using data from the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). The FTA variable was constructed
based on data from the World Trade Organization and from De Sousa (2012), as well from
the European Commission (see Table A.1). Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the
above variables. The FTA variables considered are listed in the lower part of Table 1. In
Section III we add democracy (i.e., the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV project) as well
as corruption data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).5
Method of Estimation
In the past two decades the main ex-post method used to estimate the effects on trade of
FTAs has been based on the gravity model of trade, a ‘workhorse’ model of bilateral trade
(Feenstra, 2004). This model has evolved into a sophisticated tool to analyse the broad
determinants of bilateral trade ﬂows, among them a number of policy factors such as
FTAs, trade facilitation factors, tariffs, regulations, etc.
As regards the techniques used to estimate the model, the main novelties are reviewed
by Head and Mayer (2015) and Baltagi et al. (2014). Head and Mayer (2015) review the
main trade theories supporting the model and the estimation challenges involved to be
able to identify accurately the effects on trade of speciﬁc economic and political factors.3 We assume that the announcement of the formation of the Common Economic Space by Russia could be close to a shal-
low FTA, so that the RUSshallow dummy variable used in the empirical analysis takes the value of one for trade between
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine starting in 2004. An alternative deﬁnition of RUSshallow was used (Eurasian
Economic Community) and the results remain the same. See online Appendix for a discussion of the whole set of Post-
Soviet integration agreements.
4 The countries included in the sample are listed in Appendix Table A.2 Supporting Information. The exporters considered
are EU countries plus all European, North African and Middle East countries that are EU neighbours.
5 ICRG offers an index of corruption, coding corruption in different countries on a scale from zero to six, with high scores
indicating low levels of corruption. The ICRG measure has extensive coverage and uses a single survey methodology for all
countries, which permits comparisons across countries and over time. This index is highly correlated with alternative cor-
ruption measures, including corruption perceptions scores compiled by Transparency International.
© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exports 164700 4.79e+08 3.42e+09 0 1.43e+11
Lnexports 121249 15.93 3.590 0 25.68
Lngdpi 163350 24.82 1.884 20.57 28.92
Lngdpj 161650 24.07 2.190 18.72 30.42
Lndist 164700 8.36 .864 1.90 9.88
Contig 164700 .024 .152 0 1
Comcol 164700 .058 .233 0 1
Smctry 164700 .007 .083 0 1
Comlang 164700 .086 .281 0 1
EU 164700 .066 .248 0 1
Eushallow 164700 .056 .230 0 1
Eudeep 164700 .005 .071 0 1
RUSdeep 164700 .058 .234 0 1
RUSshallow 164700 .045 .208 0 1
Turkey 164700 .0002 .016 0 1
FTA-East 164700 .003 .056 0 1
Note: ln denotes natural logarithms, exports are in thousands of US$. gdpi and gdpj denote gross domestic product of ex-
porter and importer country, respectively. Dist is distance between capital cities of origin and destination countries. Contig,
comcol, smctry and comlang are dummy variables that take the value of 1 when the trading countries share a border, have
ever had a colonial relationship, were part of the same country in the past, or have a common language, respectively.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso and Per Magnus Wijkman4Baltagi et al. (2014) focus instead on presenting the econometric techniques proposed
most recently to estimate these effects consistently and efﬁciently. We follow these papers
in our choice of model speciﬁcations and estimation techniques.
According to the underlying theory that has been reformulated and extended by Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003), our model assumes a constant elasticity of substitution and
product differentiation by place of origin. In addition, prices differ among locations due to
symmetric bilateral trade costs. The reduced form of the model is speciﬁed as
Xijt ¼ YitYjt
YWt
tijt
PitPjt
 1σ
(1)
The empirical speciﬁcation in log-linear form is given by
In Xijt ¼ ln Yit þ ln Yjt  ln YWt þ 1 σð Þln tijt  1 σð Þln Pit  1 σð Þ ln Pjt (2)
where Xijt is bilateral exports from country i to country j in year t, and Yit, Yjt and YtW are
the gross domestic products in the exporting country, the importing country and the world
in year t. tijt denotes trade costs between the exporter and the importer in year t and Pit and
Pjt are the so-called multilateral resistance terms.
6 σ is the elasticity of substitution
between all goods.6 Multilateral resistance terms reﬂect relative trade costs with respect to the rest of the world. This concept was introduced
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) into the gravity model. Bilateral trade is not only affected by bilateral interactions,
but also by interactions with the rest of the world.
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and multilateral resistance terms. The trade cost function is assumed to be a linear func-
tion of a number of trade barriers, namely the time-invariant determinants of trade ﬂows,
including distance, common border, common colonial past and common language
dummies and the time-varying FTA variable. In line with the recent gravity literature
the multilateral resistance terms are modelled as time-varying or time-invariant country-
speciﬁc dummies, depending on the estimation procedure. Substitution of the trade cost
function into equation (2) with an idiosyncratic error term suggests estimating
ln Xijt
  ¼ a0 þ a1 ln Yit þ a2 ln Yjt þ a3ln Dij þ a4Langij þ a5Colonyijþ
a6 Borderij þ a7Smctryij þ a8FTAijt þ γt þ uijt
(3)
where Dij denotes geographical distance from country i to country j, Langij and Colonyij
take the value of one when countries i and j share ofﬁcial language or have ever had a
colonial relationship and zero otherwise, Borderij takes the value of one when the trading
countries share a border and zero otherwise, Smctryij takes the value of one when coun-
tries i and j were part of the same country in the past and FTAijt takes the value of one
when the trading countries are members of an FTA and zero otherwise. γt denotes a set
of year dummies that proxy for business cycle and other time-variant common factors
(globalization) that affect all trade ﬂows in the same manner.
In equation (4) we introduce a set of dummies, dit and djt, to control for the multilateral
resistance terms. We are still able to estimate the coefﬁcients of the income variables
because we construct country-and-time dummies that vary every ﬁve years (y) instead
of yearly (t). In addition, rather than adding the usual time-invariant gravity variables to
control for differences in trade costs (distance, etc.), we use country-pair ﬁxed effects
(γij) to control for bilateral unobserved characteristics. The equation is given by
ln Xijt
  ¼ γij þ β1ln Yit þ β2lnYjt þ β3RTAijt þ∑diyIiy þ∑djyIjy þ uijt: (4)
Our initial estimation strategy follows Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Eicher et al.
(2012) and Head and Mayer (2015), suggesting the use of country-pair ﬁxed effects to
control for endogeneity of the FTA effects and the use of exporter-and-time and
importer-and-time dummy variables to control for so-called multilateral resistance factors
(for comparison, we present the usual ﬁxed effects estimation with only bilateral ﬁxed
effects and time ﬁxed effects). Additional problems that arise in the estimation are caused
by the presence of zero trade ﬂows and heteroscedasticity in the error term (non-constant
variance in the unexplained part of the model). To tackle these two issues we estimate the
model as suggested in Head and Mayer (2015), using a multinomial Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (MPML) estimation following Eaton et al. (2012) and an EK-Tobit as in
Eaton and Kortum (2001). The MPML consists of estimating a Poisson model using
the market share (Xij/Xj) as the dependent variable and adding country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effects as regressors. The model speciﬁcation is given by
Xijt
Xjt
¼ γt þ β1lnYit þ β2lnYjt þ β3lnDij þ β4Langij þ β5Colonyijþ
β6Borderij þ a7Smctryij þ β8FTAijt þ∑diIi þ∑djIj þ εijt:
(5)© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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of the dependent variable for a given origin (Xij, min for all j) and the natural log of the
new variable is used as the dependent variable in a Tobit-type regression (intreg in Stata).
The selection of the appropriate estimator depends on the process generating the error
term. Under the assumption of a Poisson-type error term it would be better to use MPML
or the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) but, under log-normality, EK-Tobit
is preferred. The solution proposed here is to assume that all missing values are zeros and then
use a MaMu (Manning and Mullahy, 2001) test to check for the process generating the error
term.7 Since we could not reject the assumption of a Poisson-type error term in our data, we
estimated the gravity model using the MPML as suggested by Head and Mayer (2015).
Alternative approaches to estimating the gravity model of trade, including zero trade
ﬂows, have been proposed. Helpman et al. (2008) suggest a two-step approach in which
ﬁrst, the probability to export to a given destination is estimated, and in the second step
some elements of the ﬁrst step are incorporated in the estimation of the positive trade
values – namely, a control for sample selection and a control for ﬁrm heterogeneity. Da-
vies and Kristjánsdóttir (2010) use a Heckman two-step approach (Heckman, 1979), con-
trolling for selection bias in the second step where the dependent variable is the
magnitude of exports given that exports are positive. We also use these procedures as a
robustness check on our results.II. Main Results of Various Regional Integration Agreements
The DCFTAs recently signed by the EU include not only trade issues, but also an increas-
ing number of provisions concerning foreign investment, competition policy, sanitary and
phytosanitary standards, technical regulations, intellectual property rights, rules of origin,
etc. The EU’s DCFTAs are signiﬁcantly more extensive than those previously applied or
currently proposed by Russia. We try to identify the trade effect of speciﬁc agreements by
focusing speciﬁcally on their scope. For instance, the EU has signed DCFTAs with sev-
eral countries since 2000, the effects of which can already be identiﬁed and could be com-
parable in scope to the DCFTAs negotiated with Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and also
Ukraine.8 But these countries could instead decide to reverse course, as Armenia did al-
ready, and join the ECU, thus remaining under Russia’s inﬂuence. The main aim of this
section is to evaluate the trade effects of agreements with Russia compared with trade
agreements with the EU and thereby to add some economic reasoning to the political de-
bate. To this end, we will distinguish between FTAs proposed by Russia, including the
Common Economic Space9 (RUSshallow) and ECU (RUSdeep),10 and FTAs or
DCFTAs proposed by the EU and estimate their trade effects. Appendix Table A.1 lists
the agreements we considered that were in place during the period under study.117 See Martínez-Zarzoso (2013, p. 321, eq. 13). The results from the test are available upon request. In some cases, the test
results were inconclusive. Hence, we also present the results obtained from the EK-Tobit model.
8 The DCFTAs considered are with Albania (2006), Croatia (2002) and Macedonia (2001).
9 The Common Economic Space was announced in 2003 and involved Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia
and Ukraine. The RUSshallow dummy variable will take the value of 1 after 2004 for these countries.
10 We assume that the ECU became operational in 2010, as suggested by a reviewer.
11 We consider FTAs as shallow agreements and FTA&EIA or CU&EIA as DCFTAs (Table A.1).
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Table 2: Gravity model: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed effects Fixed effects with MRT1 MPML with MRT2
Dependent variable: Ln exports Ln exports Export share
Lngdpi 0.704*** 0.480*** 0.533***
[0.0408] [0.0342] [0.0788]
Lngdpj 0.648*** 0.699*** 0.716***
[0.0265] [0.0293] [0.0628]
EU (full membership) 0.215*** 0.152*** 1.413***
[0.0359] [0.0466] [0.0769]
EUshallow 0.101*** 0.0376 2.301***
[0.0301] [0.0325] [0.0705]
EUdeep 0.285*** 0.356*** 0.578***
[0.0835] [0.0931] [0.103]
RUSdeep 0.161*** 0.301* 0.0546
[0.0571] [0.157] [0.123]
RUSshallow 0.0783 0.00533 0.158*
[0.0485] [0.0549] [0.0810]
Turkey 0.150 0.317 2.307***
[0.164] [0.256] [0.632]
FTA-East 0.267 0.126 1.287***
[0.233] [0.214] [0.145]
Constant 17.73*** 13.05*** 44.90***
[1.200] [0.648] [2.261]
Time Fixed Effects Yes Countryspeciﬁc Yes
Observations 116,293 116,293 157,721
R-squared (within) 0.246 0.291 0.393a
Number of bilateral pairs 8,268 8,268 
Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
FE denotes bilateral ﬁxed effects and MRT1 denotes multilateral resistance terms (exporter-and-time and importer-and-time
dummy variables). MTR2 denotes exporter and importer dummy variables. Coefﬁcients for bilateral variables are omitted in
column (3). MPML denotes Multinomial Pseudo Maximum Likelihood. The variables are deﬁned in the note below Table 1.
aPseudo R2.
European FTAs, institutions and exports 7We estimate equations (4) and (5) for a panel of 60 exporters and 150 importers in the
period 1995 to 2012 (see Appendix Table A.2 for a list of countries).
The baseline results are presented in Table 2. The ﬁrst column presents the result of
estimating a variation of equation (3) with bilateral ﬁxed effects (γit) and time ﬁxed ef-
fects12 (γit) and the second column presents the result of estimating equation (4) with
the multilateral resistance proxies (exporter-and-time and importer-and-time dummies)
and with bilateral ﬁxed effects. Column (3) shows the result of applying the MPML
method with zero trade ﬂows and with export shares as dependent variable (equation (5)).
Our results suggest that entering into trade agreements with the EU provides a greater
stimulus to trade than joining the agreements promoted by Russia. Consider ﬁrst column
(3), where row 3 shows that full accession to the EU (2004 and 2007 enlargements)12 The coefﬁcients of the time-invariant bilateral variables (distance, common language, common colony and same country)
cannot be directly estimated and are subsumed in the bilateral ﬁxed effects.
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Thorvaldur Gylfason, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso and Per Magnus Wijkman8increased export shares by 311 percent (e1.413 – 1 = 3.11); however, as stated above, this
is not an explicit option for EaP countries.
Consider next the effect of trade agreements with the EU and with Russia. A DCFTA
with the EU (EUdeep, row 5) will increase export shares less than full membership, or by
86 per cent (e0.578 – 1 = 0.86), whereas a DCFTA with Russia (RUSdeep, row 6) will not
result in any signiﬁcant increase in export shares for the EaP countries considered. We
surmise that this result reﬂects the fact that FTAs with Russia are less deep and less
strictly implemented than comparable FTAs with the EU.
As regards the shallow FTAs, the results are less stable and vary widely across speciﬁca-
tions, making them less robust. By including zero trade in column (3) the estimate for a shal-
low FTA with the EU is quite high – export shares will be nine times larger – and probably
biased upwards, whereas according to column (2) there is no effect on trade.13 On the other
hand, our results suggest that the announcement of forming a Common Economic Space with
Russia (shallow FTA) has not had positive effects on trade; in fact, the results in column (3)
suggest that trade will even be reduced (RUSshallow). Finally, a shallow FTA among EaP
States will result in nearly a trebling of export shares (e1.287 – 1 = 2.62) by column (3). Again,
the effects are probably exaggerated because we only have data since 1995/1996 for some
countries among which trade has expanded rapidly in recent years, as well as due to possible
measurement errors in the trade data in the early years of the sample. Even so, our results ac-
cord with those of Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003), who report evidence of strong home bias in
trade within east and central Europe (see also Djankov and Freund, 2002).
Many have observed that agreements with the EU are likely to eliminate a wider range of
trade barriers on a wider range of commodities and services than agreements with Russia. In
addition, they are implemented more effectively than those between Eurasian countries.
Thus, we are not comparing like with like agreements, but a typical agreement with Russia
with a typical similar agreement with the EU. Our results conﬁrm econometrically the ﬁnd-
ings of previous case studies that agreements with Russia produce inferior results.14 The
former Soviet Republics have had great difﬁculty in creating the institutions necessary to im-
plement rules and procedures required by well-functioning market economies.
Table 3 presents the results from using alternative estimation techniques to tackle zero
trade. Here we also present estimates for the other bilateral time-invariant variables, since
the ﬁxed effects included in Table 3 are exporter and importer ﬁxed effects rather than
bilateral (country-pair) ﬁxed effects. The ﬁrst column uses the same method as in column
3 of Table 2, but shows different effects for speciﬁc EaP countries, namely Armenia,
Georgia and Ukraine. Columns 2 and 3 present estimates obtained by using alternative
estimation techniques that also consider the existence of zero trade ﬂows in the data, an
EK-Tobit model in column 2 and a PPML model in column 3.
The results in Columns 2 and 3 accord with those reported in Column 1 concerning the
sign and signiﬁcance of the effects. FTAs with the EU, deep or shallow,15 boost trade,13 Missing and zero export ﬂows are excluded from the estimation in column 2, but we are able to control for time-variant
multilateral resistance factors (MRT1), whereas we are only able to control for time-invariant multilateral resistance factors
(MRT2) in column 3, because the estimation of the model does not converge with MRT1.
14 Kubicek, 2009; Libman, 2007; Olcott, Aslund and Garnett, 1999; Wirminghaus, 2012.
15 The results for EU shallow bilateral agreements shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 suggest that trade increases by
6.2% and 25%, respectively, in keeping with the view that more trade gains should be expected from signing deep agree-
ments rather than shallow ones. This is not the case in the results obtained for the model estimated with export shares.
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Table 3: Gravity model: Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3)
MPML with MRT2 EK-Tobit with MRT2 PPML with MRT2
Dependent variable: Export Share Ln Exports Exports
Lngdpi 0.533*** 0.446*** 0.678***
[0.0788] [0.0329] [0.0535]
Lngdpj 0.716*** 0.558*** 0.609***
[0.0628] [0.0230] [0.0482]
Lndist 0.0578** 1.561*** 0.0621**
[0.0277] [0.0151] [0.0254]
Contig 1.030*** 0.150*** 0.989***
[0.0423] [0.0392] [0.0397]
Comcol 0.167 1.317*** 1.067***
[0.117] [0.0318] [0.0908]
Smctry 0.727*** 0.604*** 0.505***
[0.0634] [0.0659] [0.0460]
Comlang 0.142*** 0.917*** 0.369***
[0.0522] [0.0221] [0.0296]
EU 1.414*** 0.0881*** 0.483***
[0.0769] [0.0222] [0.0458]
EUshallow 2.302*** 0.0670*** 0.187***
[0.0705] [0.0195] [0.0349]
EUdeep 0.578*** 0.269*** 0.330***
[0.103] [0.0599] [0.0788]
RUSdeep 0.0562 0.107 0.0301
[0.123] [0.0683] [0.0824]
RUSshallow 0.160** 0.0374 0.125**
[0.0809] [0.0419] [0.0584]
Turkey 2.312*** 0.615*** 1.278***
[0.634] [0.0996] [0.117]
Armenia 1.841*** 0.839*** 1.118**
[0.375] [0.258] [0.443]
Georgia 2.452*** 3.166*** 2.512***
[0.122] [0.112] [0.131]
Ukraine 1.111*** 1.159*** 0.367***
[0.152] [0.0910] [0.122]
FTA-East 1.287*** 1.573*** 0.555***
[0.145] [0.0812] [0.119]
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 157721 157721 157721
Pseudo R2 0.390 -- 0.906
Log pseudolikelihood 160.248 233398,610 2.204e+13
Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. MRT2 denotes multilateral resistance
terms (exporter and importer dummy variables). M(P)PML denotes Multinomial (Poisson) Pseudo Maximum Likelihood.
The variables are deﬁned in the note below Table 1. The effects shown in line FTA-East were calculated in a separate re-
gression that excluded FTAs with Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine.
European FTAs, institutions and exports 9whereas FTAs with Russia do not (they may even reduce trade). The effects vary slightly,
which is not surprising in view of the different underlying assumptions of the estimated
models. Further, FTAs with Turkey as well as Armenia and Georgia are good for trade,© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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suggesting that trade with other EaPs is 11 times larger (six times for Armenia and three
times for Ukraine) after the agreements entered into force. The gravity dummies (common
language, common border, colonial links, same country) by and large exert signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on trade.
As a ﬁrst robustness check we estimated the model using the two-step approach of
Helpman et al. (2008). The results, available upon request, suggest the same general
pattern as the alternative approaches. We ﬁnd no positive effect for FTAs with Russia16
and positive and signiﬁcant effects for FTAs with the EU.
As a second robustness check, given the striking variability of the EUshallow dummy
across speciﬁcations, we tried to disentangle the more heterogeneous effects included in
EUshallow agreements. To this end, we differentiated between the EU agreements that
are classiﬁed as EIAs (Economic Integration Agreements) in Appendix Table A.1 and
those that are only FTAs, with non-EaP countries outside Europe. Among the former
are the agreements with Mexico in 2000, Korea in 2011, Chile in 2003 and
CARIFORUM in 2008. Trade with those countries is not signiﬁcantly larger after the
agreements. The results appear to be driven by other agreements. We conclude that due
to the high correlation between the dummies representing shallow bilateral agreements
it is hard to identify separate effects using aggregate trade data. A more fruitful approach
would be to use sectoral trade in combination with tariff data, a task left for further
research.
Last, we place our results in the existing literature by comparing them with those
reported by Kohl (2014). Also using the gravity model of trade and panel data tech-
niques,17 Kohl estimates the effect of 166 single EIAs with data from 1950 to 2010 for
150 countries. His sample of countries differs from ours and covers a longer period (his
ends in 2010, ours in 2012). Nevertheless, we make some tentative comparisons of the
results obtained for agreements in which Russia is (or has been) a member with our
ﬁndings. As shown by Kohl (2014, Table 5), none of the estimates for Russia’s agree-
ments with Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Ukraine is statistically signiﬁcant. The
same applies to the ECU and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) estimates;
the latter is even negative (1.55*) and signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level. In contrast,
Kohl ﬁnds a number of positive effects on trade for EU single agreements with some
Baltic states (Latvia: 0.74*) and among pairs of former Soviet Republics (e.g. Georgia-
Kazakhstan: 0.88**; Georgia-Turkmenistan: 0.01*).
In sum, the evidence shows that FTAs with Russia produce negligible positive or
even negative effects – because, we surmise again, they stay on paper without being
implemented. A tentative explanation of why trade potential with Russia remains
unexploited is the poor quality of the institutional setting in the trade agreements
proposed by Russia as well as the high levels of corruption perceived in some
EaP countries.16 The estimated coefﬁcient for RUSshallow is 0.15 (3.16) and for RUSdeep 0.05 (1.02); robust t-values are within
brackets.
17 Kohl (2014) estimates a ﬁxed-effects version of the gravity model with importer-year and exporter-year effects that is
similar to our results in column 2 of Table 2 and also a similar model in ﬁrst differences. However, he does not tackle
the zero-trade ﬂows issue.
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Our next task is to use the estimates from the preceding section to assess whether the
quality of institutions has affected trade in EaP states. Georgia and Moldova surpass other
EaP states in terms of democracy and have relatively low levels of corruption. Armenia
and Ukraine are borderline cases as concerns the transition to both democracy and market
economy. Mansﬁeld et al. (2002, 2007) suggest that a democratic society is more prone to
liberalize foreign trade than an autocratic one, since trade barriers create rents which ben-
eﬁt a small minority and encourage the emergence of oligarchs that veto tariff reductions.
To evaluate the direct effect of democracy and corruption on EaP exports we extend to
panel data the two-step approach suggested for cross-sectional data by Eaton and Kortum
(2001).18 In the ﬁrst step, we estimate the gravity model with country-and-year ﬁxed
effects and bilateral ﬁxed effects and save the coefﬁcients obtained for the exporter-
and-year dummy variables (∑ditIit). The speciﬁcation is similar to equation (4) but with
exporter dummies varying yearly instead of every ﬁve years.19
In the second step, we use the estimated exporter-and-time ﬁxed effects as a dependent var-
iable and regress it on the Polity2 variable representing democracy (see Section I) and on corrup-
tion as reported in the International Country Risk Guide (Section I, footnote 9). In this way, we
aim to isolate the variation of trade that is not explained by bilateral time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity and by trade integration. Since we would like to interpret our second-step esti-
mates as causal effects, we estimate themodel withmethods intended to control for endogeneity.
The ﬁrst column in Table 4 shows estimates obtained from a panel data model with
country ﬁxed effects and where the regressors are the ﬁrst lag (at time t-1) and the ﬁrst
lead (at time t+1) of the Polity2 variable. We add the lead to test for endogeneity as sug-
gested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). The second and third columns add time effects
and allow for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation AR(1) in the residuals.20 The results suggest that
a one-point increase in the Polity2 score will increase exports by about twelve percent
(column 3). For example, in Azerbaijan and Belarus, with democracy scores of minus
seven from the late 1990s onward, the potential for increasing trade is huge if they move
toward more democratic institutions. Most of the EaP states could beneﬁt from additional
exports by improving their democracy scores. Mansﬁeld et al. (2002) show that an effec-
tive democracy provides an incentive for politicians to enter FTAs with other countries.
Such agreements provide a ‘surveillance mechanism’ that assures voters that politicians
prevent special interests from enjoying rents provided by protection.21
We then used our proxy for corruption as a regressor. The results in column (4) of
Table 4 suggest a weak negative correlation between corruption and exports. At ﬁrst,18 This approach is also recommended by Head and Mayer (2015) for cross-sectional estimation.
19 Alternatively, we can take the time-variant part of the residual from the gravity model estimated in Table 2, column 1,
and aggregate the exponents of the residuals across exporters for use in a second- step equation as described in the text.
The results, available upon request, remain virtually unchanged.
20 As a robustness check we estimated the model using dynamic OLS and dynamic AR(1) models to control for
endogeneity and autocorrelation by adding to the list of independent variables in levels their leads and lags in ﬁrst differ-
ences. The results, which reﬂect long-run effects and are available upon request, remain similar. Positive and signiﬁcant
long-run effects are obtained for Polity2 and positive but not signiﬁcant effects for corruption.
21 Mansﬁeld et al. (2002) conclude that over the postwar period pairs of democracies are twice as likely to enter a
preferential trade agreement as are a democracy and an autocracy, and that the latter pair is twice as likely to enter a preferential
trade agreement as a pair of autocratic countries. Furthermore, the likelihood of a given country entering into a PTA increases
with both the size and the proximity of its partner country.
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Table 4: From Institutional Quality to Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Panel_
CFE
Panel_
CFE
Panel_
CFE_AR(1)
Panel_
CFE
Panel _
CFE
Panel_
CFE_AR(1)
Polity2 (t-1, i) 0.124* 0.110** 0.123*
[0.066] [0.052] [0.065]
Polity2 (t+1, i) 0.059
[0.081]
Corrupt (t-1, i) 0.158* 0.057 0.080
[0.082] [0.064] [0.079]
Corrupt (t+1, i) 0.172*
[0.099]
Constant 0.150 0.779*** 0.196* 1.718*** 0.608* 0.409***
[0.237] [0.203] [0.106] [0.318] [0.317] [0.149]
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 397 424 372 246 266 246
R-squared 0.031 0.634 0.110 0.748
Number of countries 25 25 25 20 20 20
Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are shown within brackets. CFE denotes country ﬁxed
effects.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso and Per Magnus Wijkman12the causality between corruption and exports seems to be bidirectional since the lead (t+1)
is also negative and signiﬁcant, but only at the 10 per cent level. However, the coefﬁcient
turns out to be positive and not statistically signiﬁcant once time dummies (or an AR(1)
term) are added to the model (also, the lead term became insigniﬁcant). Indeed, a positive
effect of corruption on exports could be expected in the short run if trade barriers are
evaded through bribes (see Dutt and Traca, 2010; De Jong and Bogmans, 2011). For
the same reason, trade could encourage corruption (reverse causality is suggested by
the coefﬁcient of the lead value). However, equally valid is the expectation of a negative
long-run effect of trade on corruption, and vice versa. Our results cannot disentangle these
effects, possibly due to the short time span for which data are available. Moreover, in our
sample of exporters,22 most of which have trade agreements with the EU, we could ex-
pect to see the effects of corruption vary across sectors as protection is higher for agricul-
tural products than for manufactured products. However, estimating the effect of
corruption on sectoral trade is beyond the scope of this paper.
In sum, our econometric results suggest that trade agreements with the EU stimulate
the EaP countries’ trade signiﬁcantly more than trade agreements promoted by Russia.
Furthermore, DCFTAs between Georgia and the other EaPs,23 and similarly for
Moldova, will also procure more trade gains than shallow FTAs. We conclude that a more22 Data on Polity2 are available for only 25 of the countries in our sample, and on corruption for 20 countries; see online
Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4.
23 The EaP countries have many common standards – a legacy of their common Soviet past. This is not what we mean by
‘DCFTA scenario’ among the EaP countries. Instead, we mean an agreement as deﬁned by the EU containing approxima-
tion of legislation concerning sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical regulations, international property rights, rules
of origin and customs regulations and procedures as well as liberalisation of certain services. We assume a deep and com-
prehensive free trade agreement between EaP countries to be equivalent to the DCFTA agreements they have adopted with
the EU.
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corruption and rent-seeking.
IV. Creating a Common Neighbourhood and Saving the EaP
Our results suggest that the optimal policy for EaP countries is to negotiate DCFTAs with both
major trade partners, but especially with the EU. Russia urges the EaP countries to join the ECU,
but this precludes them from having deep FTAs with the EU.24 In order to maintain control of
its ‘near abroad’, Russia has initiated violent conﬂicts with Ukraine as well as with Georgia.
To resolve these conﬂicts it is necessary to consider the EaP countries as a common
neighbourhood rather than as an exclusive ‘near abroad’ of one or the other bloc. Each
EaP nation has the sovereign right to conduct its own trade policy.
The Eastern Partnership is a key option for the EaP countries. Therefore, the EU must
ensure full implementation of the DCFTAs that it has signed with Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine. It must, furthermore, realize the objective shared with Russia of a ‘common eco-
nomic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok’25 by extending an offer to negotiate a DCFTA
with Russia, conditional upon Russia’s cessation of hostilities with Ukraine and interna-
tional supervision of elections in the disputed areas.
Such a proposal may appear unrealistic in the current situation. Russia is far from
possessing the necessary economic and political characteristics required for a DCFTA.
It is not a democracy; it produces few goods and services that other nations want to
buy except unreﬁned oil, arms, chemicals and ferrous metals; it lacks a free press; and
its market economy functions poorly (Gylfason et al., 2014). Moreover, Russia’s interna-
tional status after the annexation of Crimea and its military support of separatist forces in
Donetsk and Luhansk approaches that of international pariah. However, in times of
conﬂict it is essential to prepare for a post-conﬂict era. The EU must attempt to convince
President Putin that Russia stands to gain more from viewing its ‘near abroad’ as a com-
mon neighbourhood rather than as a lost territory to be regained through military means.
Hindsight provides beneﬁts to which foresight is not privy. After the event, it seems
clear that misjudgements by both sides created a serious international conﬂict. We
conclude by identifying some reasons for why the EaP went wrong and indicating what
can be done to salvage it.
The EU overestimated the EaP states’ economic and political readiness for DCFTAs.
Campos (2013) stresses the ‘institutional vacuum’ that has characterized the EaP states
since their independence. This article has shown the importance of democracy and free
press as instruments both for institutional change and for providing a solid political base
for international agreements. The problems that Ukraine encountered prior to initialling
and signing its DCFTA reﬂect its weak initial conditions as concerns democracy, free press
and market economy. Events have shown that the Commission’s focus on institution-
building to qualify for a DCFTA, criticized by EaP states at the time, was correct.
Russia, too, seriously misjudged the situation. Like others, it failed to foresee that the
EU would conclude DCFTAs so rapidly with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova.24 True, they could have DCFTAs with the EU but only if the Eurasian Customs Union negotiates one with the EU. This,
however, would make DCFTAs with the EU for the EaP countries hostage to developments in Russia and signiﬁcantly de-
lay and dilute them compared with the DCFTAs they have already negotiated with the EU.
25 Statement by President of the European Commission Barosso following the EU–Russia Summit, 28 January, 2014.
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underestimated the strong popular support that existed in parts of Ukraine for the demo-
cratic values that the EU represents. Misjudgements by both sides thus created a serious
conﬂict centred on Ukraine with ramiﬁcations for Georgia and Moldova.Conclusion
This article suggests that the EaP states stand to gain signiﬁcantly from trade agreements
with the EU, whether deep or shallow, while the customs union proposed by Russia is
likely to provide negligible beneﬁts. It also shows that the EaP states stand to gain
signiﬁcantly from FTAs with each other. While further research is necessary to ascertain
more precisely the size of these beneﬁts, their rough relative magnitude is supported by
other studies (e.g. Kohl, 2014). These beneﬁts suggest that the EU should ensure that
the EaP survives its current difﬁculties. True, the EU’s soft power is ineffective as a
response to Russia’s hard power. But the EU cannot leave Ukraine to deal with Russia
on its own as best it can. This would soon put Georgia and Moldova in the same situation
Ukraine is in now. It would also have serious consequences for the credibility of the EU.
An option available to the EU is to internationalize the conﬂict, involving the
United Nations and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)
to a signiﬁcantly larger extent than at present. It will need to complement its own soft
power with the hard power of the international organizations to separate the warring
factions, maintain law and order and arrange referenda so that the populations in disputed
regions can express their views concerning national borders in a democratic manner. The
EU can also negotiate a DCFTA with Russia, thereby creating a ‘single economic space
from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ as that country has requested. This economic space would
include as a ‘common neighbourhood’ those EaP states willing and able to participate.
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